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THE NEW FIDUCIARIES 
Natalya Shnitser* 
ABSTRACT 
The regulation of employer-sponsored retirement plans in the United 
States relies on fiduciary standards drawn from donative trust law to 
regulate the conduct of those with authority or discretion over plan assets. 
The mismatch between the trust-based fiduciary framework and the rights 
and interests of employers and employees has contributed to the high cost 
of pension fund investing and the significant gaps in pension coverage in 
the private sector. In recent years, state and local governments have 
stepped in to reduce the retirement coverage gap by creating state-
facilitated retirement savings programs for private-sector workers who 
lack access to employment-based coverage. In 2019, five states—
including California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington—
had programs open to participants.  
This Symposium Essay shows that while the five programs vary in the 
roles and responsibilities imposed on state actors and on the participating 
employers, there is a notable shift away from traditional fiduciary 
obligations as the primary constraint on the conduct of plan 
administrators, particularly with respect to plan fees. In a stark departure 
from the regulatory regime for plans sponsored by private-sector 
employers, several states impose explicit caps on total fees that may be 
charged to plan participants. Furthermore, while in some cases, the fee 
caps are paired with traditional fiduciary obligations for state 
administrators, in other cases the statutory provisions make no mention 
of fiduciary duties. The Essay presents the benefits and the risks of the 
new regulatory approaches and outlines a research agenda to assess the 
effectiveness of fee caps as either a complement to or substitute for 
existing fiduciary-based regulatory frameworks. The findings from the 
state experiments in retirement plan governance will offer important 
insights to policymakers seeking to improve retirement security in the 
United States.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*David and Pamela Donohue Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As concerns about the ability of millions of Americans to retire with 
dignity and financial security continue to grow, state and local 
governments are stepping in with new programs to facilitate saving by 
private-sector workers without access to employer-sponsored retirement 
plans.1 While each state program has unique features, the new programs 
collectively signal an important shift in the roles of private employers, 
employees, and states in the provision of retirement benefits. States are 
taking increasingly active roles in the provision of retirement plans for 
 
 1. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-111SP, THE NATION’S 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM: A COMPREHENSIVE RE-EVALUATION IS NEEDED TO BETTER PROMOTE FUTURE 
RETIREMENT SECURITY 3 (2017) [hereinafter “GAO REPORT”], https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-
111sp.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SVL-PHPG], (finding that “[t]raditional pensions have become much less 
common, and individuals are increasingly responsible for planning and managing their own retirement 
savings accounts, such as 401(k) plans. Yet research shows that many households are ill-equipped for this 
task and have little or no retirement savings.”). The federal government also took steps to address 
retirement security in 2019. In December of  2019, Congress passed the SECURE Act, which was signed 
into  law on December 20, 2019. Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act 
(SECURE Act), incorporated into Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-94. Most 
notably, the SECURE Act permits, for the first time, the pooling of unrelated employers in  
“pooled employer plans” that may be sponsored and administered by third-party institutions—including 
banks, insurance companies, recordkeepers or other commercial enterprises.  
2
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private-sector workers, and in so doing, they are experimenting not only 
with elements of plan design but also with features of plan governance.2  
Whereas fiduciary standards are at the core of the regulatory regime for 
employer-sponsored private-sector retirement plans, this Essay 
documents the states’ embrace of fee rules to address shortcomings of 
existing plans. The Essay is organized as follows: Part I describes the 
limitations of the current retirement system that have prompted the state 
interventions, including the reluctance of smaller businesses to establish 
retirement plans and the prevalence of high fees among existing 
employer-sponsored plans. Part II describes the evolution of the 
regulatory regime under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (“ERISA”) and the centrality of fiduciary standards in the regime 
as it applies to defined-contribution retirement plans. Part III introduces 
the state programs that aim to expand access to retirement-savings plans. 
Of the programs currently open to participants, the ones in California, 
Illinois, and Oregon require employers that do not otherwise sponsor a 
retirement plan for their employees to automatically enroll the employees 
in Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”) overseen by the states. In 
contrast, Washington has established a marketplace where smaller 
employers can select retirement plans that have been pre-screened by the 
state, while Massachusetts now serves as the plan sponsor of a multiple-
employer plan (“MEP”) for smaller non-profit organizations. Part IV 
reviews the key governance provisions for each state program and 
highlights the significant departures from the existing trust-based ERISA 
fiduciary framework. Part IV argues that the particular permutations of 
regulatory features in the new state programs present a unique opportunity 
to evaluate the effectiveness of fiduciary obligations and fee caps in 
retirement savings plans. The Essay concludes by considering how the 
lessons from the new state programs may reshape the U.S. retirement 
system in the long run.  
I. THE RETIREMENT COVERAGE GAP IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR  
Only two-thirds of private-sector workers have access to employer-
sponsored plans.3 U.S. law does not require employers to sponsor any 
 
 2. See generally Kathryn L. Moore, State Automatic Enrollment IRAs After the Trump Election: 
Are They Preempted by ERISA?, 27 ELDER L.J. 51 (2019); Kathryn L. Moore, Closing the Retirement 
Savings Gap: Are State Automatic Enrollment IRAs the Answer?, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35 (2016); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Retirement in the Land of Lincoln: The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 173 (2016); Ctr. for Ret. Initiatives, McCourt Sch. of Pub. Policy, Georgetown Univ., 
State Facilitated Retirement Savings Programs: A Snapshot of Plan Design Features, State Brief-19-03, 
(Dec. 31, 2019), https://cri.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/States_SnapShotPlanDesign6-
3-19FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM9S-2MFV]. 
 3. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 23. 
3
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retirement savings plans. Many employers—particularly smaller 
employers—commonly cite the lack of administrative resources and the 
expenses associated with retirement plans as factors that discourage plan 
formation.4  
Among employees who do have access to an employer-sponsored plan, 
there is significant variation in plan quality. Beyond variation in the 
magnitude of the employer contributions, plans vary in the amount of 
administrative fees charged to plan participants, the types of individual 
investment options available on the plan “menus” and the costs associated 
with such investment options.5 High fees and poorly constructed 
investment menus—both of which have been particularly prevalent in 
smaller employer plans—can have devastating effects on the ability of 
plan participants to save for retirement through defined contribution 
plans.6 In some cases, researchers have documented that “the additional 
fees from poorly constructed plan menus have eliminated the preferential 
tax treatment afforded to 401(k) plans.”7 
In recent years, as defined contribution plans have assumed a central 
role in the U.S. retirement system, retirement plan fees, expenses, and 
investment options have garnered the attention of markets participants, 
 
 4. Employer Barriers to and Motivations for Offering Retirement Benefits, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS (2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2017/06/employer-
barriers-to-and-motivations-for-offering-retirement-benefits [https://perma.cc/7D7N-LT8T] (showing 
that “[m]ost commonly, employers without plans said that starting a retirement plan is too expensive to 
set up (37 percent). Another 22 percent cited a lack of administrative resources.”); see also, GAO REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 23 (noting that workers employed by “smaller firms and in certain industries are less 
likely to have access” to retirement savings programs). 
 5. An employer sponsoring a 401(k) retirement plan must navigate and oversee a myriad of fees. 
The largest component of plan fees is generally associated with managing plan investments. In addition, 
there are also administrative costs of establishing and operating the plans. These include the provision of 
recordkeeping (maintaining plan records, processing employee contributions and distributions, and 
issuing account statements to employees), accounting, reporting, audit, legal, and trustee services. See 
generally DELOITTE CONSULTING, INV. CO. INST., INSIDE THE STRUCTURE OF DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION/401(K) PLAN FEES, 2013: A STUDY ASSESSING THE MECHANICS OF THE ‘ALL-IN’ FEE 
(2014), https://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_14_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/6B7Y-HN9B]; SEAN 
COLLINS ET AL., INV. CO. INST., THE ECONOMICS OF PROVIDING 401(K) PLANS: SERVICES, FEES, AND 
EXPENSES, 2016, ICI Research Perspective Vol. 23, no. 4 (June 2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/per23-
04.pdf [https://perma.cc/76M3-Z8VE]. 
 6. James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483 
(2013) (describing the problems of problems of “high mutual fund fees and poor fund selection” in 
retirement plans); Impact of Plan Size on Workers’ Retirement Income Adequacy, EMP. BENEFITS RES. 
INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://ebriorg.wordpress.com/2018/04/06/impact-of-plan-size-on-workers-
retirement-income-adequacy/ [https://perma.cc/6GE6-5MG5] (reporting that “participants can experience 
significantly greater increases [in retirement income adequacy] by simply benefiting from the economies 
of scale of large versus small plans”). 
 7. See Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive 
Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1501 (2015) (noting that “[t]he 
problem of fees is especially acute in small plans, where there is less competition and fewer resources are 
likely to be devoted by the plan sponsor to administering the plan.”). 
4
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the Department of Labor8 and plaintiffs’ attorneys.9  The fee disparities 
have precipitated a host of lawsuits claiming that plan sponsors and 
service providers violated their fiduciary obligations by, for example, 
offering more expensive actively managed funds instead of index funds,10 
offering more expensive retail class funds instead of institutional class 
funds,11 failing to properly monitor record-keeping fees,12 and including 
hedge fund, private equity investments,13 or “proprietary” funds 
associated with the plan sponsor.14 While the long-term consequences of 
the fiduciary litigation are not yet known,15 the litigation over plan fees 
has revealed the current system’s reliance on trust-based fiduciary 
obligations as the primary constraint on the conduct of plan sponsors and 
those with discretion or control over plan assets. The current reliance 
would surprise the original drafters of ERISA. The next Part explains how 
 
 8. Moore, Closing the Retirement Savings Gap, supra note 2, at 69 (observing that “[b]ecause 
plan fees can have such a significant impact on retirement savings, 401(k) plan fees has been the subject 
of considerable scrutiny in recent years. The Department of Labor has issued a series of regulations 
mandating fee disclosure, and plan participants have filed a host of lawsuits claiming that excessive plan 
fees violate ERISA's fiduciary provisions.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Anne Tergesen, The Lawyer on a Quest to Lower Your 401(k) Fees, WALL ST. J., 
(June 9, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-lawyer-on-a-quest-to-lower-your-401-k-fees-
1497000607; Dilroop Sidhu et al., Plan Sponsor Fee Litigation Cases on the Rise, WASH. WATCH 18 
(2017), https://www.groom.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/1888_Washington-
Watch_Fall_2017_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9XW-NKGC]; George S. Mellman & Geoffrey T. 
Sanzenbacher, 401(K) Lawsuits: What Are the Causes and Consequences?, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH 
BOSTON COLL., Issue in Brief No. 18-8 (May 2018), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/IB_18-
8.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM5Q-4CKB] (listing 420 ERISA cases on “Inappropriate Investments, 
Excessive Fees, and/or Self-dealing” filed between 2006 and January of 2018). 
 10. See, e.g., Taylor v. United Techs. Corp., 354 F. App’x 525 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 11. See, e.g., Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523 (2015); Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327 (8th 
Cir. 2014). 
 12. See, e.g., Tibble, 575 U.S. at 523. 
 13. See, e.g., Sulyma v. Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm., 140 S.Ct. 768 (2020). 
 14. See, e.g., Leber v. Citigroup, Inc., 48 EB Cases (BNA) 2418 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2010); Gipson 
v. Wells Fargo & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2008); Mehling v. New York Life Ins. Co., 246 F.R.D. 
467 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2007); Dupree v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 42 EB Cases (BNA) 1510 (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 7, 2007); Franklin v. First Union Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Va. 2000).  
 15. The growth of fiduciary litigation has been associated with a downward trend in 401(k) fees, 
although it is one of multiple factors that has contributed to decreases in certain kinds of plan fees in some 
plans. See, e.g., Quinn Curtis, Costs, Conflicts, and College Savings: Evaluating Section 529 Savings 
Plans 37 YALE J. ON REG. 116, 132 (2020) (noting that “[c]lass-action lawsuits alleging breaches of 
fiduciary duty are not uncommon and have had a significant effect on lowering the fees associated with 
401(k) plans”), https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1550&context=yjreg 
[https://perma.cc/9K99-ZDUQ]. While certain fees are lower than they were fifteen years ago, there is 
concern that the fear of fiduciary litigation may discourage plan formation and stifle experimentation with 
plan design and features. Mellman & Sanzenbacher, supra note 9 (finding that “[o]n the investment side, 
the average share of assets paid to fees for 401(k) participants in mutual funds has declined over the last 
15 years….and these declines have been accompanied by corresponding decreases in 401(k) 
administrative and recordkeeping costs” but expressing concern that “the fear of litigation prevents the 
use of creative options that may improve participant outcomes – like investment vehicles designed to 
provide a lifetime income stream when participants retire.”). 
5
Shnitser: The New Fiduciaries
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
690 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
a regime so replete with rules at its inception came to rely so heavily on 
the fiduciary standard to protect participants in employer-sponsored 
retirement plans.  
II. THE LIMITS OF FIDUCIARY GOVERNANCE AND THE CURRENT 
REGULATORY REGIME 
Trust law’s central role in the governance of employer-sponsored 
defined-contribution retirement plans was not intentional. The drafting 
of ERISA predated the rise of 401(k) plans. At the time of the drafting, 
defined benefit pension plans were the norm. Employers generally 
promised monthly pension checks for retired employees, and also bore 
the risk and responsibility of setting aside and managing the money to 
pay for such benefits. When the drafters of ERISA borrowed from 
donative trust law in the 1970s, they did so for the limited purpose of 
curbing asset mismanagement by insiders with access to pension 
funds.16 But trust law was just one piece of ERISA’s protective regime. 
The drafters also imposed extensive vesting, funding, and insurance 
requirements to regulate employer conduct in the provision and 
administration of defined benefit pension plans. 
Trust law—and particularly the fiduciary regime—assumed a much 
greater governance role as the pension system changed in the decades 
after ERISA’s passage. As defined contribution plans began to replace 
defined benefit plans in the private sector, many of ERISA’s 
substantive provisions—particularly those related to funding and 
insurance—became simply irrelevant to the new plans. At the same 
time, defined contribution plans increasingly exposed employee 
participants to risks stemming from the plan administration and 
investment selection decisions of their employers, risks that did not 
exist in the same way for participants in defined benefit plans. In the 
absence of new substantive federal regulation, the trust-based 
fiduciary regime became the centerpiece of 401(k) plan governance 
under ERISA. Consequently, current regulation aims to protect U.S. 
employees primarily by subjecting those who administer private 
pension plans to trust-based care and loyalty obligations. 
As observers have noted, reliance on the fiduciary regime presents 
several challenges in the context of the non-donative, dual-settlor, 
dual-beneficiary arrangement that is the modern 401(k) plan.17 First, 
 
 16. Daniel R. Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive 
Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1988).   
 17. In the prototypical donative trust, an owner of property, called the settlor, desires to gift the 
property to one or more beneficiaries. Instead of giving a direct gift to the beneficiary, the settlor desires 
to have the property managed by a third party trustee.  The settlor transfers to the trustee the legal title to 
6
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the current fiduciary regime perpetuates ERISA’s fiction about the 
employer’s ability to wear and switch between two “hats.” The 
“settlor” hat permits the employer to consider its own interests in 
establishing, designing, and terminating a plan, and courts have 
prevented the application of ERISA’s fiduciary regime to actions 
falling within this increasingly broad category.18 The “fiduciary” hat 
requires the same employer, when acting as a fiduciary to the plan, to 
act solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.19 The 
obligations associated with the fiduciary hat arise when employers 
administer what is a form of employee compensation, even though 
other forms of compensation place employers and employees in an 
adversarial position with one another.20 Although ERISA does not 
require employers to wear the fiduciary hat when setting plan terms, 
in practice, the line between settlor and fiduciary decisions is 
inherently murky.21 Certain “settlor” design decisions have the same 
financial effects as “fiduciary” implementation or administration 
decisions. For example, employers can freely choose to offer less 
generous contributions or not to pay for certain administrative costs of 
the plan (settlor decisions). Yet, they may not, under the current 
fiduciary regime, take employer costs into consideration when 
selecting service providers or investment menu options for plan 
participants (fiduciary decisions). 
The reliance on the trust-based analogy also has given the courts 
 
the property. Consequently, the settlor’s rights with respect to the trust property terminate, the trustee 
obtains legal control, and the beneficiary gets an equitable interest. To safeguard the beneficiary from 
trustee wrongdoing, trust law subjects the trustees to strict fiduciary obligations of loyalty and prudence. 
Non-donative trust arrangements—including pension plans—deviate significantly from these 
characteristics. The traditional settlor, trustee, and beneficiary roles do not map well onto modern defined 
contribution arrangements; instead, in the current retirement plan context, both employers and employees 
take on elements of each role. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an 
Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 169 (1997); John H. Langbein, The Conundrum of Fiduciary 
Investing under ERISA, in PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY 
SECURITIES 128, 129-32 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1989); Norman Stein, Trust Law and Pension Plans, in 
PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES 1, 52 (Dan M. 
McGill ed., 1989); see also Natalya Shnitser, Trusts No More: Rethinking the Regulation of Retirement 
Savings in the United States, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 629, 629-30 (2016).  
 18. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Untrustworthy: ERISA's Eroded Fiduciary Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1007, 1011 (2018) (describing how “[t]he settlor function doctrine . . . “restrict[s] the range of 
application of ERISA’s fiduciary regime . . .”).  
 19. Nonneutral trustees must make their decisions “with an eye single to the interests of the 
participants and beneficiaries” but are not at fault if particular decisions “incidentally” benefit the 
corporation. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 20. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
1257, 1296 (2016) (suggesting that “the employer is presumptively the employee’s adversary” when 
negotiating the terms of employee benefits). 
 21. See Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the ERISA 
Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459 (2015) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the 
settlor/fiduciary doctrine). 
7
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considerable latitude to determine the scope of prudent and loyal 
conduct by plan fiduciaries.22 Courts have grappled with the reality 
that employers may terminate existing plans or hesitate to form new 
ones if they believe that the compliance costs or litigation risks are too 
high.23 The reach of fiduciary obligations in the context of retirement 
plans has been constrained by employer threats to cease offering plans 
to their employees.24 In applying the trust analogy, courts have 
emphasized the employers’ role as trust settlors, affording them 
significant  deference in setting the scope of “trustee” authority to 
administer the trust and interpret its terms.25 Over time, 
“uncoordinated, low-visibility judicial decisions” have “radically 
pruned back” both “the scope and the intensity of fiduciary 
oversight.”26 
Finally, ERISA’s fiduciary-centric regime may have had the 
perverse result of decreasing participants’ monitoring of plan 
sponsors. By imposing the “fiduciary” label on employers, ERISA 
may, in effect, mask the employers’ conflicts of interest and lack of 
expertise.27 At the same time, even if employees were more vigilant, 
their enforcement options are limited because litigation is itself costly 
 
 22. See, e.g., Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015) (finding that the 
court has “often noted that an ERISA fiduciary’s duty is ‘derived from the common law of trusts.’”) 
(quoting Central States, Southeast & Sourthwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 
559, 570 (1985)). 
 23. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 524 
(2004) (stating that “employers’ decisions to maintain and establish defined contribution plans are 
voluntary; if the costs of such plans outweigh the perceived benefits, employers will abandon such plans 
or will not establish them in the first place.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (finding that “courts may have to 
take account of competing congressional purposes, such as Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced 
protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so 
complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering 
welfare benefit plans in the first place.”). 
 25. The Supreme Court has held that “[p]rinciples of the law of trusts . . . establish that a denial of 
benefits . . . must be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan expressly gives the plan 
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the 
plan’s terms, in which cases a deferential standard of review is appropriate.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Bruch 489 U.S. 101, 102 (1989) (emphasis added). Plans’ sponsors have guaranteed the deferential 
standard of review by granting the required discretion to the plan administrators. See generally John H. 
Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207 (1991).  
 26. Wiedenbeck, supra note 18, at 1007. (“The trust law analogy has come to dominate judicial 
thinking about employee benefit plans. Yet despite its rise to rhetorical prominence, ERISA fiduciary law 
has been dramatically transformed by a series of uncoordinated, low-visibility judicial decisions on 
multiple fronts. These apparently unconnected case law developments reveal a startling pattern of 
mutually reinforcing restrictions on ERISA's protection of pension and welfare benefits. . . . Both the 
scope and the intensity of fiduciary oversight have been radically pruned back in the courts.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 900 (2011) 
(warning that an overbroad application of fiduciary duties “could unnecessarily constrain parties from 
self-protection in contractual relationships, impose excessive litigation costs, provide an unsuitable basis 
for contracting, and impede developing fiduciary norms of behavior.”). 
8
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss3/3
2020] THE NEW FIDUCIARIES 693 
and requires employees to overcome significant free-rider and 
coordination problems.28 Apart from employee litigation or agency 
oversight, retirement plan participants have no meaningful recourse. 
As the trust “beneficiaries,” they are effectively locked in to their 
employer plans and unable to access alternative investment options 
without losing the tax benefits associated with employer-sponsored 
plans.29 Meanwhile, as described in Part I, because many private U.S. 
employers do not offer any retirement benefits to their employees, 
some forty million workers are without access to an employer-
sponsored plan.30 
III. STATE EFFORTS TO CLOSE THE COVERAGE GAP 
Over the last decade, numerous states have begun to explore and 
implement programs to expand access to retirement savings benefits for 
private-sector employees. Because the state programs depend on 
employer intermediaries, they have had to grapple with the issue of 
ERISA preemption.31 Although the Department of Labor created a safe 
harbor for such programs in 2016,32 Congress used the Congressional 
Review Act to overturn the agency rule in 2017. President Trump signed 
 
 28. The class action and contingent fee mechanisms, though used against certain large employers, 
may not be as effective for smaller employers where aggregate recoveries would be smaller. See Robert 
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621, 679 (2004) (observing that “[w]hen 
liability rules are the chief check on agency costs, there is a practical limit to the number of residual 
claimants that the organization can  support. The greater the number, the more serious the collective action 
dynamic that will weaken any individual’s incentive to monitor and, if cost justified, to litigate.”).  
 29. See, e.g., Liam Pleven, How to Lobby for a Better 401(k), WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-lobby-for-a-better-401-k-1424459507 (observing that while “many 
plans are hobbled by high fees and inadequate choices . . . . Few people want to question the judgment of 
people who sign their paycheck and control promotions and raises.”).  
 30. 51 Percent of Private Industry Workers Had Access to Only Defined Contribution Retirement 
Plans, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: ECON. DAILY (Oct. 2, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2018/51-percent-of-private-industry-workers-had-access-to-only-defined-
contribution-retirement-plans-march-2018.htm [https://perma.cc/C4SG-FYU7] (reporting that as of 
“March 2018, 51 percent of private industry workers had access to only defined contribution retirement 
plans through their employer”).  
 31. Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Section 4(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA 
generally applies to any “employee benefit plan” established or maintained by an employer “engaged in 
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce” or any plan established or maintained by 
unions representing employees engaged in commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a). If any state program is found 
to establish employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, ERISA would preempt the state law creating 
the program. 
 32. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs That Sponsor or Facilitate Plans 
Covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71936-02 (U.S. Dep’t 
of Labor Nov. 18, 2015) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509). Under the final regulation, state automatic 
enrollment IRAs would not have constituted employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA if they met 
eleven stated requirements.  
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the Congressional resolution into law on May 17, 2017, and the 
Department of Labor withdrew the regulatory safe harbor a month later.33 
Despite the ongoing questions and litigation over ERISA preemption, 
state and local governments have moved forward with new programs. By 
2019, the five programs described below were all open to participants.34 
In March 2020, a federal district court in California ruled that California's 
Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program is not preempted by 
ERISA.35 The decision supports the states’ position on preemption and is 
expected to accelerate the growth of additional state-sponsored retirement 
programs for private-sector employees.36  
A. State Automatic Enrollment Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) 
1. The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program 
In 2012, the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act37 
created the mandate and the institutional body to study the feasibility of 
an automatic enrollment program for California. After the feasibility 
analysis was completed in January of 2016, legislation was approved to 
begin developing the program. The CalSavers Retirement Savings 
Program was piloted in 2018, and then launched it statewide in July of 
2019.38 As stated in the program materials, the “CalSavers Retirement 
Savings Program was designed to give employers an easy way to help 
their employees save for retirement, with no employer fees, no fiduciary 
responsibility, and minimal ongoing responsibilities.”39 
Pursuant to the law, California employers who do not already offer a 
“qualified” employer-sponsored retirement plan and who have five or 
 
 33. Moore, State Automatic Enrollment IRAs, supra note 2, at 53, 63-64. 
 34. Experts have disagreed whether, in the absence of the safe-harbor initially promulgated by the 
Department of Labor the state programs in California, Illinois and Oregon are preempted by ERISA. 
Several lawsuits have been filed claiming preemption and the litigation is ongoing. Id. at 66-67.  
 35. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Program, 2020 BL 89150 
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2020) (finding that “CalSavers is neither an employee benefit plan nor does it relate 
to an ERISA plan” and thus it is not preempted by ERISA). 
 36. See, e.g., Hazel Bradford, More States Jumping onto Secure Choice Bandwagon, PENS. & INV., 
Mar. 23, 2020.  
 37. California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, CAL GOV’T CODE §§ 100000-100044 
(West 2018). 
 38. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 100004 (West 2018)(“There is hereby established a retirement savings 
trust known as the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust to be administered by the board 
for the purpose of promoting greater retirement savings for California private employees in a convenient, 
voluntary, low-cost, and portable manner. After sufficient funds are made available for this title to be 
operative, the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust, as a self-sustaining trust, shall pay all 
costs of administration only out of moneys on deposit therein.”). 
 39. Help your employees save for retirement, CALSAVERS, https://employer.calsavers.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/2CT2-7AZQ].  
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more employees must either sponsor a retirement plan or participate in 
the CalSavers program.40 Under CalSavers, the role of the employer is to 
facilitate payroll contributions into their employees’ Roth IRA accounts. 
Employees are automatically enrolled in the program with a current 
default savings rate of 5% of gross pay.41 Employees can change the 
savings rate and opt out of (and back into) the program at any time.42 
Employers cannot make contributions to employee accounts.43 
The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Investment Board 
implements and oversees the program and selects investment options 
available to individual participants.44 The nine-member board, which is 
chaired by the State Treasurer, includes the Treasurer, the Director of 
Finance, the Controller, an individual with retirement savings and 
investment expertise appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules, an 
employee representative appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly, a 
small business representative appointed by the Governor, a public 
member appointed by the Governor, and two additional members 
appointed by the Governor.45 Day-to-day program operations are 
currently handled by Ascensus College Savings Recordkeeping Services, 
LLC (“ACSR”). The statute states explicitly that the “program is a state-
administered program, not an employer-sponsored program,” that 
“employers shall not have any liability” for any employee participation or 
investment decisions, and that “employers shall not be a fiduciary, or 
considered to be a fiduciary” over the program.46 
2. Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program  
The Illinois plan and the California plan have many similar features. 
The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act established the state’s 
program to help employees who do not have access to a retirement 
savings plan through work save for retirement through Roth IRAs.47 The 
 
 40. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 100032 (West 2018). 
 41. Although the statutory provision set the default contribution rate at 3% of wages, it authorized 
the California Investment Board to adjust the default rate to between 2% and 5%. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 
100032(i), (j) (West 2018). Subsequent regulations set the initial default contribution rate to 5% with 
automatic escalation of 1% each year until it reaches 8%. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 10005 (2018). 
 42. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(f) (West 2018). 
 43. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032 (West 2018). 
 44. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 100002 (West 2018). 
 45. Id. 
 46. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100034 (West 2018). 
 47. Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1-95 (2018); ILL. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 74, § 721.100 (2018) (“The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program is a retirement 
savings program in the form of an automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA for the purpose of 
promoting greater retirement savings for private-sector employees in a convenient, low-cost, and portable 
manner.”). 
11
Shnitser: The New Fiduciaries
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
696 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program requires employers who have 
twenty-five or more employees, have been in operation for at least two 
years, and do not offer an employer-sponsored retirement plan to facilitate 
Illinois Secure Choice.48 In their facilitator role, employers provide the 
information to establish payroll deductions; they do not incur any fees or 
make any contributions to the accounts of participating employers. The 
statute disavows any fiduciary obligations for participating employers.49 
As in the California program, the current default savings rate is 5% of 
gross pay and employees can opt out (or back in) at any time.50  
The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Board implements and oversees the 
program, selects the investment options available to individual 
participants, and serves as the trustee of the Illinois Secure Choice 
Savings Program Fund.51 The Illinois Secure Choice Board has seven 
members: the State Treasurer; the State Comptroller; the Director of the 
Governor’s Office of Management and Budget; two public 
representatives with expertise in retirement savings plan administration 
or investment, or both, appointed by the Governor; a representative of 
participating employers, appointed by the Governor; and a representative 
of enrollees, appointed by the Governor.52 Ascensus College Savings 
Recordkeeping Services, LLC (“ACSR”) currently serves as the program 
administrator. ACSR and its affiliates are responsible for day-to-day 
program operations.53  
3. Oregon Retirement Savings Plan 
In 2015, Oregon established the Oregon Retirement Savings Board and 
 
 48. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 74, § 721.200 (2018) (establishing that “employer” for purposes of the 
Illinois Secure Choice program is defined as “a person or entity engaged in a business, industry, 
profession, trade, or other enterprise in Illinois, whether for profit or not for profit, that: has at no time 
during the previous calendar year employed fewer than 25 employees in the State; has been in business at 
least 2 years; and has not offered a qualified retirement plan in the preceding 2 years.”). 
 49. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/75 (2018) (stating that “[p]articipating employers shall not 
have any liability for an employee's decision to participate in, or opt out of, the Program or for the 
investment decisions of the Board or of any enrollee” and further clarifying that “[a] participating 
employer shall not be a fiduciary, or considered to be a fiduciary, over the Program. A participating 
employer shall not bear responsibility for the administration, investment, or investment performance of 
the Program. A participating employer shall not be liable with regard to investment returns, Program 
design, and benefits paid to Program participants.”). 
 50. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/55 (2018). Illinois law charges the Illinois Board with selecting 
a default contribution rate between 3% and 6% of wages. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/30 (2018). The 
default contribution was set at 5%. See Contributions, ILL. SECURE CHOICE, 
https://saver.ilsecurechoice.com/home/savers/contributions.html [https://perma.cc/C9UF-ABDX]. 
 51. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/30 (2018). 
 52. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/20 (2018). 
 53. A New Choice for Retirement Savings, ILL. SECURE CHOICE, https://www.ilsecurechoice.com/ 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2019).  
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charged it with developing the Oregon Retirement Savings Plan for 
Oregon employees.54 The program, which went into effect in 2017, 
requires all employers to participate unless they certify to the state that 
they offer an alternative qualified retirement plan.55 As in California and 
Illinois, employers in Oregon serve only to facilitate contributions via 
payroll deductions, which are then deposited into employees’ Roth IRA 
or IRA accounts.56 The Oregon Retirement Savings Board has set the 
default contribution rate at 5% with auto-escalation at the rate of an 
additional 1% each year until a maximum contribution of 10% is 
reached.57 
The Oregon Retirement Savings Board oversees the program and 
selects the investment options available to individual participants.58 The 
Board has seven members: the State Treasurer; four members appointed 
by the Governor, including a representative of employers, a representative 
with experience in investments, a representative of an association 
representing employees, and a member of the public who is retired; a 
member of the Oregon House of Representatives; and a member of the 
Oregon Senate.59 Ascensus College Savings Recordkeeping Services, 
LLC is the program administrator responsible for day-to-day program 
operations.60  
B. State-Facilitated Marketplace Model  
1. Washington's Small Business Retirement Marketplace 
Washington’s Small Business Retirement Marketplace is built on the 
premise that “small businesses, which employ more than forty percent of 
private-sector employees in Washington, often choose not to offer 
retirement plans to employees due to concerns about costs, administrative 
burdens, and potential liability that they believe such plans would place 
 
 54. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 178.200-178.245 (West 2018). 
 55. Or. Admin. R. 170-080-0015. Notably, the program explicitly aims to “[k]eep administration 
fees in the plan low” and will “[n]ot impose any duties under the [ERISA] . . . on employers.” OR. REV. 
STAT. § 178.210 (2018). 
 56. OR. ADMIN. R. 170-080-0035. For further analysis of how employers have carried out their 
roles, see Anek Belbase, Laura D. Quinby & Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher, Auto-IRA Rollout Gradually 
Speeding Up, B.C. CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. 20-5 (2020), available at  https://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/IB_20-5..pdf. 
 57. OR. ADMIN. R. 170-080-0035 (2018). 
 58. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.205 (West 2018). 
 59. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.200 (West 2018). 
 60. OregonSaves is open to everyone, OREGONSAVES, https://www.oregonsaves.com 
[https://perma.cc/RC6W-VSXV]. 
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on their business.”61 Legislation enacting the program was passed in 
2015, and the marketplace formally opened in March of 2018.62 In effect, 
the Retirement Marketplace is a website where individuals and employers 
“can comparison shop for state-verified, low-cost retirement savings 
plans.”63 Participation in the Retirement Marketplace is entirely voluntary 
for both employers and employees. The plans offered through the website, 
which can include various IRAs, 401(k)s, and certain life insurance 
products designed for retirement purposes, must be first verified and 
approved by Washington State officials at the Department of Financial 
Institutions or the Office of the Insurance Commissioner to ensure they 
comply with Retirement Marketplace requirements.64 The plans on the 
marketplace cannot charge administrative fees to employers and, subject 
to limited exceptions, they cannot charge enrollees more than 1% in total 
annual administrative fees.65 Furthermore, the plans must go through an 
annual renewal process to ensure the plan and provider remain in good 
standing.66 
The marketplace currently offers a profit-sharing plan and four types 
of 401(k) plans from Saturna Trust Company, as well as a Roth and a 
traditional IRA option from Finhabits.67 Because the marketplace merely 
lists plan options, the state has no ERISA liability and does not assume 
any of the employer’s legal responsibilities. Employers, meanwhile, 
retain any ERISA obligations that would normally apply, albeit with the 
benefit of having the plans pre-screened and monitored by state 
agencies.68 The marketplace enables employers to decide which type of 
 
 61. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.330.730 (West 2018). 
 62. Washington Small Business Retirement Marketplace Act, WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 43.330.730-750 (West 2018). 
 63. The Marketplace, RET. MARKETPLACE, https://retirement-marketplace.com/the-marketplace/ 
[https://perma.cc/78VA-K7NX]. Per the statute, the “‘Washington small business retirement marketplace’ 
or ‘marketplace’ means the retirement savings program created to connect eligible employers and their 
employees with approved plans to increase retirement savings.”  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.330.732 
(West 2018). 
 64. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.330.735 (West 2018). 
 65. Id.  Notably, as set forth in the applicable regulations, “a financial services firm may charge 
retirement plan enrollees a de minimis fee for new and/or low balance accounts in excess of one hundred 
basis points in total annual fees only if the department of commerce and the financial services firm 
negotiate and agree upon the amount of the de minimis fee prior to the issuance of the verification letter.” 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE 208-710-030. 
 66. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 208-710-060 (2018) (setting forth the annual renewal application 
procedure). 
 67. Available Plans, RETIREMENT MARKETPLACE, https://retirement-marketplace.com/available-
plans/ [https://perma.cc/C5EE-RJDJ]. 
 68. The statute provides that “The department shall not expose the state of Washington as an 
employer or through administration of the marketplace to any potential liability under the federal 
employee retirement income [security] act of 1974.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.330.742 (West 2018). 
At the same time, the statute emphasizes the benefits of ERISA protections. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
43.330.730 (West 2018) (“The marketplace furthers greater retirement plan access for the residents of 
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plan best meets their and their employees’ needs, including whether they 
prefer an ERISA-covered plan. 
C. State-Administered Multiple-Employer Plan 
1. Massachusetts Defined Contribution CORE Plan 
In 2012, Massachusetts created the Connecting Organizations to 
Retirement (CORE) Plan, which aims to help Massachusetts nonprofit 
employees save and invest for a financially secure retirement.69 The 
program, which launched in 2017, is a voluntary 401(k) multiple 
employer plan that smaller non-profits may choose to adopt. 70 The Office 
of the State Treasurer and Receiver General is the sponsor of the CORE 
Plan and assumes most administrative and investment responsibilities, 
thus reducing the burden on participating not-for-profit employers.71 Plan 
materials indicate that for employers, the CORE Plan “relieves much of 
the fiduciary responsibility” that the employer would otherwise have by 
utilizing an outside plan.72 
The plan currently provides for a default employee contribution of 6% 
with annual auto-escalation of 1% or 2%, based on the employer election, 
until a maximum contribution 12%.73 The employer may elect to make 
contributions.74 The state, as the plan sponsor, has outsourced various 
elements of plan administration. For example, Empower Retirement 
serves as the plan’s recordkeeper;75 Aon Hewitt serves as the Investment 
Manager, and is tasked with developing and monitoring the investment 
structure of the CORE Plan;76 and Northeast Professional Planning Group 
Fiduciary Services (NPPG-FS) is the Plan Administrator that performs 
administrative fiduciary services to ensure operational and administrative 
 
Washington while ensuring that individuals participating in these retirement plans will have all the 
protections offered by the employee retirement income security act.”). 
 69. Qualified defined contribution plan for employees of not-for-profit employer, MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 29, § 64E (West 2018). 
 70. Id. (“In order to participate in the plan, a not-for-profit employer shall execute a participation 
agreement, agree to the terms of the plan and operate the plan in compliance with the Code and ERISA.”). 
 71. 960 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.02 (2018) (“The State Treasurer shall be the MEP Sponsor unless 
otherwise specified.”). 
 72. Professional Oversight, CORE, https://www.empower-
retirement.com/client/mass/employer/professional-oversight.html [https://perma.cc/9QNR-CBQE].  
 73. Plan overview, CORE 1, https://www.empower-
retirement.com/client/mass/employer/resources/pdf/CORE-Plan-Adoption-Brochure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DV9B-LPSU]. 
 74. Id. at 2 (The employer may choose to make either a “Safe Harbor Employer-Matching 
Contribution” or a “Safe Harbor Non-Elective Contribution.”).  
 75. Id. at 3, 5. 
 76. Id. at 3.  
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compliance.77 At present, program materials indicate that there is a sixty-
five dollar annual fee for participation in the CORE Plan that is 
automatically deducted from each participant’s account. Furthermore, 
there are certain elective plan features that may have additional fees, and 
“each investment option has an administrative, advisory and investment 
management fee that varies by investment option.”78 
IV. FIDUCIARIES WITH FEE CAPS: EXPERIMENTS IN PLAN GOVERNANCE 
The new state programs respond directly to the coverage and fee 
challenges in the current system. Each seeks to expand access to lower-
cost retirement savings options, particularly for workers employed by 
smaller employers who are otherwise unlikely to take on the risk and 
responsibility of establishing and administering employer-sponsored 
plans. Beyond the common goal, however, the five state programs 
currently open to participants vary in the degree of responsibility assigned 
to the state and the employer, and in the approach to controlling plan 
fees.79 Table 1 below summarizes the key fiduciary provisions for state 
actors and for the participating employers under each plan. It also tracks 
any statutory or regulatory ceilings or restrictions on plan fees. Following 
the description of the key fiduciary and fee provisions in each state, this 
Part creates a typology of regulatory approaches embodied in the five 
programs, and the lessons that can be gleaned by comparing different sets 
of programs to one another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 5.  
 79. As observers have acknowledged, there is no guarantee that the state programs themselves will 
not suffer governance or oversight challenges. See, e.g., Moore, State Automatic Enrollment IRAs, supra 
note 2 at 93 (stating that “[o]f course, there is a risk of mismanagement by the entities charged with 
managing and administering the programs”); Moore, Closing the Retirement Savings Gap, supra note 2 
at 69 (noting that in “recent years, plan fees paid by public sector pension funds have come under 
increasing scrutiny”).  
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Table 1: Fiduciary & Fee Provisions Across State-Administered 
Retirement Savings Programs for Private-Sector Employees 
 
State  Fiduciary Provisions, If Any, for 
State Actors 
Fiduciary 
Provisions, If 
Any, for 
Participating 
Employers  
Fee Provisions, 
If Any 
CA “The board and the program 
administrator and staff, including 
contracted administrators and 
consultants, shall discharge their 
duties as fiduciaries with respect to 
the trust solely in the interest of the 
program participants as follows: 
(1) For the exclusive purposes of 
providing benefits to program 
participants and defraying 
reasonable expenses of 
administering the program. 
(2) By investing with the care, 
skill, prudence, and diligence under 
the circumstances then prevailing 
that a prudent person acting in a 
like capacity and familiar with 
those matters would use in the 
conduct of an enterprise of a like 
character and with like aims.” CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 100002 (d) (West 
2018). 
 
No fiduciary 
obligations for 
participating 
employers. CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 
100034 (West 
2018). 
“On and after 
six years from 
the date the 
program is 
implemented, on 
an annual basis, 
expenditures 
from the 
administrative 
fund shall not 
exceed more 
than 1 percent of 
the total 
program fund.” 
CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 100004 
(West 2018). 
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IL “Fiduciary Duty. The Board, the 
individual members of the Board, 
the trustee appointed under 
subsection (b) of Section 30, any 
other agents appointed or engaged 
by the Board, and all persons 
serving as Program staff shall 
discharge their duties with respect 
to the Program solely in the interest 
of the Program's enrollees and 
beneficiaries as follows: 
(1) for the exclusive purposes of 
providing benefits to enrollees and 
beneficiaries and defraying 
reasonable expenses of 
administering the Program; 
(2) by investing with the care, skill, 
prudence, and diligence under the 
prevailing circumstances that a 
prudent person acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with those 
matters would use in the conduct of 
an enterprise of a like character and 
with like aims; and 
(3) by using any contributions paid 
by employees and employers into 
the trust exclusively for the 
purpose of paying benefits to the 
enrollees of the Program, for the 
cost of administration of the 
Program, and for investments made 
for the benefit of the Program.” 
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/25 
(West 2018). 
No fiduciary 
obligations for 
participating 
employers. 820 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 80/75 (West 
2018). 
“The Board 
shall keep total 
annual expenses 
as low as 
possible, but in 
no event shall 
they exceed 
0.75% of the 
total trust 
balance.” 
820 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 
80/30 (West 
2018). 
 
OR No reference to fiduciary 
obligations. 
No reference to 
fiduciary 
obligations for 
participating 
employers.  
“The Board will 
charge each IRA 
a Program 
administrative 
fee not to 
exceed the rate 
of 1.05% per 
annum, to 
defray the costs 
of operating the 
Program, 
including 
internal and 
external 
administration, 
and operational 
and investment 
costs, including 
for professional 
investment 
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management 
services.” 
OR. ADMIN. R. 
170-080-0045 
(2018). 
 
 
WA No fiduciary obligations for state 
agencies. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 43.330.730 (West 2018). 
Traditional 
ERISA 
obligations apply 
to any ERISA-
covered plans. 
WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 
43.330.730 (West 
2018). 
 
“Financial 
services firms 
… may not 
charge the 
participating 
employer an 
administrative 
fee and may not 
charge enrollees 
more than one 
hundred basis 
points in total 
annual fees….” 
WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 
43.330.735 
(West 2018). 
 
 
MA As the plan sponsor, the State 
Treasurer assumes ERISA 
fiduciary obligations. 
 
“The Plan is created and 
maintained and shall be 
administered pursuant to the 
applicable sections of the 
ERISA….”960 MASS. CODE REGS. 
6.03 (2018). 
No specific 
guidance in the 
statute or 
regulations, but 
under ERISA, 
participating 
employers in 
multiple-
employer plans 
retain fiduciary 
responsibility for 
selecting and 
monitoring the 
MEP provider.80  
No fee caps set 
forth in 
applicable 
statute or 
regulations. 
 
 
The programs described in Table 1 vary along three primary 
governance dimensions: (1) whether fiduciary obligations are explicitly 
imposed on the state either as a matter of state law or federal law; (2) 
whether participating employers are subject to fiduciary obligations either 
 
 80. See generally Colleen E. Medill, Regulating ERISA Fiduciary Outsourcing, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
505 (2017). 
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as a matter of state or federal law;81 and (3) whether the statutory 
framework for the state program imposes any kind of fee caps or ceilings 
on administrative, investment, or total fees.  
California and Illinois have embraced a model where the state serves 
as a facilitator of the automatic enrollment programs. Both states 
explicitly impose fiduciary obligations on the state agencies and 
administrators tasked with implementing and overseeing the plans. Both 
states likewise make clear that the programs do not impose fiduciary 
obligations on the participating employers. And both embrace explicit fee 
caps. The Oregon program offers the same kind of automatic enrollment 
IRA and also imposes fee caps, but the state statutes lack any explicit 
references to fiduciary obligations for state administrators of the program. 
Washington state explicitly disavows fiduciary obligations for the state 
agencies that oversee the certification and review of plans for 
Washington’s marketplace. Several of the plans available on the 
marketplace, however, are traditional 401(k) plans that, if adopted, would 
subject participating employers to all obligations under ERISA. In 
addition to the traditional fiduciary obligations, however, the Washington 
program imposes a fee cap for all plans that wish to be included on the 
marketplace. Finally, the state of Massachusetts plan places the state 
Treasurer’s office in the role of plan sponsor under ERISA. Pursuant to 
the Massachusetts arrangement, participating non-profit employers would 
retain some fiduciary responsibility for the selection and oversight of the 
plan sponsor. 
As states continue to experiment with ways to promote retirement 
security,82 the new programs will pave the way for important empirical 
analyses of the different models, all of which depart from the traditional 
 
 81. Ultimately, the research findings on the impact of fiduciary obligations in state-administered 
retirement programs will have implications for the governance of other state-administered programs, most 
notably 529 College Savings Plans. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 15, at 133 (“In short, as compared with 
401(k), plans and IRAs, college savings plans promise a best-of-both-worlds approach. With college 
savings plans, investors benefit from curated menus, economies of scale, disinterested boards, and a 
competitive marketplace in which investors have outside options. All that is missing is a serious fiduciary 
liability regime in the style of ERISA.”). 
 82. For a description of different programs, see generally Ctr. for Ret. Initiatives, McCourt Sch. 
of Pub. Policy, Georgetown Univ., State Facilitated Retirement Savings Programs, supra note 2. States 
like Minnesota, for example, are experimenting with a “carrot and stick” approach that combines an 
automatic enrollment IRA plan (“IRAP”) with a state-sponsored multiple-employer plan (MEP). As in 
Illinois, “IRAP would require every eligible employer in the state to automatically deduct a percentage of 
payroll from worker's paychecks and remit it to an individual account held in trust by the plan. The worker 
is free to opt out of the program at any time but initially the employer must automatically enroll the worker 
and remit payment unless the worker opts out.” Employers could avoid the requirement to enroll in IRAP 
by either establishing their own employer-sponsored plans or by enrolling the state’s MEP. As in 
Massachusetts, the MEP “is an ERISA compliant qualified 401(k)-type defined contribution plan” See, 
e.g., Chad Burkitt, A More Secure Choice: Minnesota's Two-Pronged Approach to State Level Retirement 
Savings Programs, 40 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL'Y & PRAC. 183, 201–03 (2019). 
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ERISA framework by introducing a role for the states in the provision of 
retirement savings plans for U.S. workers in the private sector.83 Will the 
states be better suited to carry out the oversight and administrative 
functions than individual employers? Will they be more vigilant if faced 
with fiduciary obligations? And how will any fiduciary standards interact 
with fee rules? Will such rules serve as the ceiling on plan fees, or as both 
a ceiling and a floor?  
A comparison of enrollment rates and total plan fees will help shed 
light on such challenging questions in the coming years.84 In particular, 
the comparison of California and Illinois plans with the Oregon plan will 
offer first insights on the effectiveness of state statutory provisions that 
explicitly impose fiduciary obligations on state actors. The comparison of 
traditional employer-sponsored plans (outside any state-administered 
system) to those in the Washington marketplace will provide information 
on the effectiveness of fee caps and state certification in determining the 
total plan fees for employer-sponsored plans. A comparison of terms of 
the 401(k) plans available through the Washington marketplace with 
those of the multiple-employer plan sponsored by Massachusetts will 
shed light on the effectiveness of the state (versus private sector 
employers) as the plan sponsors under an ERISA fiduciary regime, and 
on the role of explicit fee caps in controlling total all-in fees.  
CONCLUSION 
Forty-five years have passed since the historic passage of ERISA. 
Since that time, the very nature of retirement savings in the U.S. has 
evolved. Defined contribution plans have taken the place of traditional 
pensions and are now a core component of the retirement system. Yet the 
ERISA regulatory framework was not designed for such plans. Many of 
its rules have simply become irrelevant over time, and much of the 
governance burden has fallen on the statute’s trust-based fiduciary 
 
 83. Scholars have noted that there is, at present, considerable uncertainty and debate over the 
effectiveness of the regulatory approaches adopted by the states. Moore, Closing the Retirement Savings 
Gap, supra note 2,  at 70  (arguing that “[w]hether the states’ rules/cap-based approach to fees is likely to 
be more effective than the standards-based approach currently used in private and public-sector pensions 
is an empirical question with no ready answer. Moreover, whether administrative fees can, in fact, be kept 
low depends on a host of factors such the size of the program, the structure of the program, and who 
administers the program.”); see also Nari Rhee, Lessons from California, Connecticut, and Oregon: How 
Plan Design Considerations Shape the Financial Feasibility of State Auto-IRAs,” State Brief 16-03, Ctr. 
for Ret. Initiatives, McCourt Sch. of Pub. Policy, Georgetown Univ. (2016), 
https://cri.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Policy-Brief-16-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW6L-
PK2P] (identifying the critical drivers of plan costs and providing long-term fee projections).  
 84. Of course, the variation in the fiduciary and fee provisions described here is only part of the 
story. Success of the new programs – at least as measured by participation rates and plan fees – will also 
depend on program design, plan size, and board composition. 
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standards. The shortcomings of the current regime have manifested both 
in the proliferation of suboptimal employer-sponsored plans, and in the 
lack of access to any employer-sponsored plans for some forty million 
U.S. workers. 
In recent years and with increasing speed, state governments have 
stepped in to fill gaps in retirement plan access for private-sector 
employees.85 The state programs in California, Illinois, Oregon, 
Washington, and Massachusetts represent the range of new experiments 
in plan governance, with states currently embracing fee caps as either a 
complement to or substitute for fiduciary obligations for plan 
administrators. This Essay situates the new programs in the historical 
context and provides a typology of the state approaches to retirement plan 
governance. Measuring the effectiveness of such state programs over the 
coming years will offer scholars and policymakers important insights on 
the ideal role of federal, state, and local governments in the U.S. 
retirement system, and on the combination of rules and standards most 
likely to ensure retirement security for U.S. workers.  
 
 
 85. See Bradford, More States Jumping onto Secure Choice Bandwagon, supra note 36 (observing 
that “[s]ince 2012, 43 states have either considered or enacted legislation to study or begin implementing 
state-facilitated retirement savings programs for their private-sector workers not already covered,” with 
2019 “busier than ever” and with 2020 beginning with “legislative activity in 17 states and at least seven 
states actively studying how to implement a program”). 
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